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Abstract
We analyze gender bias in school enrollment by developing a two-period model where women
become part of extended families of their in-laws. Each family decides how many children are
sent to school and thus become skilled. Gender bias occurs due to failure of the families to
internalize inter-household externalities. ‘Groom-price’ dowry worsens the situation. Under
‘bride-price’ dowry, bias exists if and only if the skill premium in the labor market is bigger
than that in the marriage market. A specific discriminatory ‘food-for-education’ policy is
shown to reduce bias, but increase total enrollment. Finally, using cross-country data, we
test some of the predictions of our theoretical analysis.
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Introduction

Gender inequality — whether in education or in wages, in health or in occupations, outside
the home or within the household, in rich or in poor countries — is well documented. This
bias against women is much more pervasive in the developing world. For example, in South
and South-East Asia the proportion of young men alive is much higher than young women
resulting in as many as 80 million ‘missing’ young women (Drèze and Sen, 1989; Bardhan
and Klasen, 1999). The most common explanation for such gender gap is summarized by
Rosenzweig and Shultz (1982) as parents allocating a larger share of the family’s resources
to children who have potential for being more economically productive as adults. To this if
we include a socially persistent backdrop of wage discrimination in the labor market, loss
of earnings from daughters following their marriage, and some proportion of unexplained
parental discrimination (Gandhi-Kingdon, 2002), sons emerge as the more preferred gender,
hence the bias.
The two most compelling areas of bias against females in developing countries are in
the labor market and in education. In this paper our focus is the gender gap in education in
developing countries within the context of certain prevailing social norms. In order to sharpen
focus we shall assume away other possible forms of bias such as that in the labor market and
in intra-household distribution of nutrients. We model parents’ behavior in making decisions
about educating their male and female children, the alternative to education being working
as child labor.1 In constructing our model we consider an extended family where the entire
household behaves as a single unitary agent as in Becker (1981). In such a family married
sons live with parents and contribute economically towards the family’s budget. Similarly,
once a daughter is married, all her assets become part of her in-law’s family (Sharma, 1993).
This assumption implies a reliance on sons’ and daughters-in-law’s incomes by families and
non-reliance on the income potential of an adult daughter.
We construct a two-period model and begin with a benchmark case in which a certain
proportion of male and a certain proportion of female children are sent to school by parents
while the rest work. It assumes that education leads to higher income for the individual.2
The extra income of an educated male child accrues to the family and that of the educated
female child (who is married at the end of period 1) goes to her in-law’s family. We assume
that a family does not internalize the externalities of daughters-in-law’s education as such
investments are made by the latter’s families. It is found that because of the above-mentioned
lack of coordination between the families, parents send a larger proportion of sons to school
compared to daughters. In other words, the fact that married daughters become part of
in-laws’ families is not by itself a reason for bias against women as for each daughter ‘lost’ a
1

Our contribution can also be seen as a contribution, and providing a gender dimension, to the fast
emerging literature on child labor. Some theoretical contributions on the economics of child labor are Basu
and Van (1998), Basu (2000), Baland and Robinson (2000), Dessy (2000), Jafarey and Lahiri (2000, 2002),
Ranjan (1999), and Gupta (2000). Econometric studies include Cockburn (2000), Emerson and D’Souza
(2000), Ravallion and Woodon (2000), Ray (2000), and Maitra and Ray (2002). For two extensive surveys
of the literature see Basu (1999) and Jafarey and Lahiri (2001).
2
See Glewwe (2002) for an extensive survey on the socioeconomic effects of education in developing
countries.
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family ‘gains’ a daughter-in-law. It is the interaction between this social institution and the
lack of coordination between families that, according to our analysis, causes discrimination.
Having set up our basic model of gender bias, we then consider two simple extensions
of this model by introducing dowry.3 The first extension involves a situation where a more
educated groom demands a higher dowry regardless of the education level of the bride. In
the second case a bride’s education level helps to lower dowry payment, regardless of the
education of the groom.
We call first case of dowry a ‘groom-price’ dowry since the dowry being paid is groom
specific. It is similar to what Sheel (1999) describes as a higher dowry being correlated with
the higher socioeconomic status of the groom’s family. It should be noted that in equilibrium
the net dowry payment is zero as we assume that each family has the same number of grooms
and brides and the equilibrium is symmetric: dowry payments for daughters cancel out with
dowry receipts for sons. However, because of the lack of coordination mentioned above, the
rates of dowry payments do affect the marginal conditions and therefore the education levels
of both male and female children. As groom price for educated males increases or the groom
price of uneducated males decreases, a larger proportion of male children are educated and
fewer female children are educated, i.e., groom-price dowry contribute towards more bias
against daughters.
In the second case, the dowry is bride-specific and we call this ‘bride-price’ dowry. A
woman’s education can be viewed as an asset she brings into the family and several studies
supports the hypothesis that educated women have more bargaining power in a family’s
decision making process (Shultz, 1999; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2000; Quisumbing and
Briere, 2000; Basu, 2001). Most of these studies have looked at how a woman’s assets at the
time of marriage adds to her bargaining position in the family. We extend this to a woman’s
education adding to her bargaining position at the time of marriage itself.4,5
In this case we find that dowry can lead to lower bias against daughters than in the
benchmark case, provided the skill premium in the marriage market is larger than that in the
labor market. It should be noted that in either of the two scenarios, it is the skill premium
in the marriage market — i.e., the difference between dowry levels for skilled and unskilled
bridegroom (for the case of groom-price dowry) or bride (for the case of bride-price dowry)
— that affects school enrollment rates. If skill-premium in the marriage market is absent,
the level of dowry payments would have no effect in our framework as in equilibrium net
dowry payments is zero: dowry payments for daughters cancel out with dowry receipts for
sons.
Finally, we examine how a food-for-education subsidy program can be used to reduce
3

Dowry is a common socio-cultural practice in many developing countries which, according to Rao (1993)
and Anderson (2003), has been rising in much of South Asia over the past decade.
4
It is to be noted that, in our framework, for both ‘groom-price’ and ‘bride-price’ dowry, it is the bride’s
family that pays dowry to the groom’s family. In the literature sometimes bride-price dowry is taken to
mean a situation where the groom’s family pays dowry to the bride’s family.
5
There is some evidence that rich households in Pakistan tend to educate their daughters purely for
marriage purposes rather than for labor market reasons, as female education is often found to be negatively
correlated with female workforce participation (see, for example, Ilahi and Jafarey (1996)).
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bias against daughters, but not at the cost of reducing total school enrollment.6 We find
that due to the substitutability between boys and girls, any subsidy for boys alone results
in the reduction of the proportion of girls being sent to school and vice versa. Thus, an
effort to increase the education of one gender, can result in a reduction in total enrollment.
In order to address this problem, we conduct a policy experiment and suggest a particular
policy reform which would reduce an existing bias without reducing total enrollment.
The lay out of the paper is as follows. The following section sets up the basic model.
Three subsections analyze in turn a benchmark model with no dowry and two extensions
involving two types of dowry mentioned above. The analysis of the food-for-subsidy policy
is taken up in section 3. In section 4, some of the predictions of our theoretical model is
tested using cross-country data. Finally, some concluding remarks are made in section 4.

2

The Theoretical Framework

We consider a society with a two-period horizon, indexed by t = 1, 2 respectively. The economy produces a single good per period. Goods are labelled 1 and 2 respectively, depending
on the period of production. The production technology is linear in effective units of labor
and normalized such that one effective unit of labor produces one unit of output per period.
The society has a number of identical households each headed by a single parent and
has N number of boys and N number of girls. Children are endowed at birth with a low skill
level, φu . But unlike their parents, children can increase their skill level to φ by undertaking
full-time schooling in the first period.
For each poor child not educated, its family receives a wage income of φu units of
output per period. For each child who undertakes schooling, the family foregoes the child’s
wage in the first period but receives a higher wage, φ in the second period.
Each parent’s preferences are represented by a utility function over the two consumption goods and a measure of the educational level of children.
v = w(c1 , c2 ) + N g(em ) + N g(ef ),

(1)

where v is utility, ci is consumption of good i (i = 1, 2), and em and ef are the proportion
of boys and girls respectively who receive schooling at t = 1. The functions w and g are
increasing and concave in their respective arguments. g(·) can be interpreted as capturing the
subjective preference that parents have for schooling over child labor.7 There is considerable
anecdotal evidence to suggest not only that most parents derive some form of disutility from
subjecting their children to labor, but also that they get positive utility from educating them
6

Ravallion and Wodon (2000) evaluate the food-for-subsidy program in Bangladesh. Jafarey and Lahiri
(2000) compare this policy with an alternative policy, viz., investment in education quality, in the presence
of credit market distortions.
7
In principle the g-function could be gender specific characterizing an inherent bias against young girls
in the society. However, since the purpose of this paper is to explain gender bias via economic and social
channels, we assume the functions to be the same.
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instead, even when the pecuniary returns to education by themselves might not warrant this
choice.8 A similar subjective preference is implicit in Basu and Van (1998).
Dowry, and therefore marriage, plays an important role in our analysis. We assume
that all young men and women get married at the beginning of period 2 to people from outside
the family. The daughters leave home to live with their in-laws and the daughters-in-law
move in with the husbands’ families. Therefore, each family continue to have N young men
and the same number of young women. However, there is an important difference between
the two genders in this respect. Since for the daughters-in-law, investment in education are
made by other families, a family has no control over how many educated and how many
uneducated daughters-in-law it can have. We assume that educated men get married to
educated women, if possible, and if the number of educated men in the society is more than
that of women, some men are left with no option but to marry uneducated women. In other
words, there is positive correlation between education of brides and grooms. But exactly how
many educated daughters-in-law a family gets depends on how many educated girls there
are outside the family, and importantly the family has no control over this number. In the
process of the marriage, the bride’s family has to pay a dowry to the bridegroom’s family.
We shall describe later on how education affects the level of dowry.
Consumption is assumed to be non-rivalrous within households, allowing us to abstract from intra-household distributional issues.9 This completes the description of households. We now proceed to the basic decision making problem facing them. For expositional
simplicity, we shall assume that there are only two families in the society.
Each household’s inter-temporal budget constraint can be expressed as:
P c1 +

φu
φ
φu
P c2
= φu + N (1 − em )φu +
+ N em + N (1 − em ) + N (sm em + sf ef )
r
r
r
r
·
¸
u
φ
φ
D
+ N (1 − ef )φu + N e∗f + N (1 − e∗f )
+
= Y (say),
(2)
r
r
r

where r is the market interest factor (one plus the interest rate), P is the price of the
consumption good per period and D is the net dowry income. e∗f represents the proportion
of educated women in the other family. sf and sm respectively are the subsidies that the
family receives for sending each girl and boy to school.
The first and the second term on the right hand side of (2) are the period 1 income of
the parent and boys respectively. The next term is the present value of parent’s income in
period 2. The fourth and the fifth terms are respectively the present values of second-period
incomes of the skilled and unskilled young men. The sixth terms is the subsidy payment
the family receives for sending their children to school. The expressions inside the square
bracket are the period 1 and discounted present value of period 2 income by young women:
period 1 income are due to daughters, but period 2 income are due to daughters-in-law.
8

A recent survey conducted in villages of six northern provinces of India, found that economic motives
are not the only reasons why poor families want their children to go to school (see The Probe Team (1999,
chs. 2 and 3)).
9
For reasons mentioned in footnote 7, we abstract away from intra-household distribution in nutrients.
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The household’s problem consists of choosing ci , i = 1, 2, and ej , j = m, f , in order to
maximize (1) subject to (2), and to the constraint, ej ∈ [0, 1], (j = m, f ). We shall consider
this problem in two stages. In the first stage, the family makes consumption decisions for
given levels em and ef . This problem gives us an indirect utility function V (P, P/r, Y ), and
therefore:
P
v = V (P, , Y ) + N g(em ) + N g(ef ),
(3)
r
where income Y is defined in (2).
In the second stage, each family maximizes its utility level, given in (3) with respect
to em and ef , taking the educational decisions of other families, e∗m and e∗f as given. Since
formalizing this problem requires specification of the net dowry income D, we consider this
in the following three subsection, starting with the benchmark case where no dowry is paid.

2.1

No dowry: the benchmark case

We consider this case of no dowry for two reasons. First, this will be used for comparison
purposes. Second, we want to highlight the fact that in our framework gender bias can occur
even in the absence of dowry.
From (2) and (3), we find the first order conditions for em and ef as
·
¸
∂v
φ − φu
u
= V3 N −φ + sm +
+ N g 0 (em ) = 0,
∂em
r
∂v
= V3 N (sf − φu ) + N g 0 (ef ) = 0.
∂ef

(4)
(5)

Equations (4) and (5) can be simplified as:
g 0 (ēm )
φ − φu
= φu ,
+ sm +
r
V̄3
g 0 (ēf )
+ sf = φu ,
V̄3

(6)
(7)

where ēm and ēf are respectively the equilibrium values of em and ef in this equilibrium and
V̄3 is the value of the marginal utility of income evaluated at the present equilibrium.
The marginal benefit of an extra boy in education is represented by the left-hand
side of (6): an increase in em leads to a marginal pecuniary gain (φ − φu ) units of secondperiod income (the so-called skill premium in the labor market), plus a marginal utility
increase of g 0 (em ), which has a pecuniary value of g 0 (ēm )/V̄3 . The term on the right-hand
side represents the marginal cost, i.e. the loss of φu units of first-period income.10 Since
10

An interior choice of em also reflects negative discounted pecuniary returns (net of opportunity cost)
to education of boys for the representative household. This in turn reflects a low level of value added by
schooling, (φ − φu ). In this situation, the subjective parental preference for education plays a crucial role
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for girls, the second-period income is due to daughters-in-law and the decision to educate
the latter or not is made by other families without any coordination with future husbands’
families, the marginal benefit of educating a girl is lower than that of educating a boy, and
the difference is given by the skill premium in the labor market. It therefore follows that the
equilibrium value of em must be higher than that of ef .11 Formally,
Proposition 1 In the absence of dowry and any differential policy intervention, more boys
than girls go to school.
To summarize the results of this section, it should be noted that fewer girls than
boys receive education for two reasons. First, daughters after marriage become part of the
extended family of their husbands. Second, the return to investment on a daughter’s education goes to her husband’s families and the families do not coordinate their actions. Thus
it is the interplay of a particular type of social institution and a failure to internalize interfamily externalities which results in a gender bias against girls as far as school enrollment is
concerned.

2.2

Groom-price of dowry

In this subsection we assume that there is a groom price for dowry, i.e., a groom commands
a dowry and the amount depends on whether he is educated or not. Denoting by Dsg and Dug
respectively the amount of dowry that an educated and an uneducated bridegroom receives,
the net amount of dowry received by the family is
D = [N em Dsg + N (1 − em )Dug ] − [N e∗m Dsg + N (1 − e∗m )Dug ] .

(8)

The term inside the first square bracket on the right hand side of (8) is the amount of dowry
received by the bridegrooms and that inside the second square bracket is the amount of
dowry paid out for the brides. Since skill level of the husbands of the family’s daughters
are decided outside the family, the family cannot affect the amount paid out by its choice of
education variables.
The first order condition for em and ef in this case are
g 0 (ẽm )
φ − φu Dsg − Dug
+ sm +
+
= φu ,
r
r
Ṽ3
0
g (ẽf )
+ sf = φu ,
Ṽ3

(9)
(10)

where ẽm and ẽf are respectively the equilibrium values of em and ef in this equilibrium and
Ṽ3 is the value of the marginal utility of income evaluated at the present equilibrium.
in determining a positive value for em . Such a situation is consistent both with evidence on the quality
of primary schooling available to poor households in developing countries and on the subjective parental
attitudes toward education amongst such households (see The Probe Team (1999)).
11
More rigorously speaking, with sf = sm , subtracting (7) from (6), we get g 0 (ēm )−g 0 (ēf ) = V̄3 [φu −φ]/r <
0. Since g 00 < 0 it then follows that ēm > ēf .
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Note that the dowries have no direct effect on the marginal conditions for ẽf as the
total payments of dowries in the present case depends on how many skilled grooms there are
outside the family which depends on decisions by other families. Comparing (9) and (10) with
(6) and (7), we find that the presence of dowry only raises the marginal benefit of sending
a boy to school (by the skill premium for the grooms in the marriage market (Dsg − Dug )/r)
and therefore there is bias against girls in the present case as well, i.e., ẽm > ẽf . Next we
want to examine if the presence of dowry increases the bias against young girls. We do so,
inter alia, in the following subsection.
2.2.1

Comparative statics

In this subsection we shall examine how the equilibrium values of ẽm and ẽf change when
some of the exogenous parameters of the model are altered. In particular, note that in our
symmetric equilibrium, i.e., em = e∗m and ef = e∗f , the equilibrium values of net dowry
income given by (8) is zero and therefore ēm and ēf are equal respectively to ẽm and ẽf
when the latter are evaluated at Dsg − Dug = 0. Therefore, if we show that dẽm /dDsg > 0,
dẽm /dDug < 0, dẽf /dDsg < 0 and dẽf /dDug > 0, it will follow that ẽm > ēm and ẽf < ēf . In
the following analysis we shall prove that this is indeed the case.
Totally differentiating (2), (9) and (10), we get
1
Y2
ẽm + ẽf
· dY = −θ1 dẽm − θ2 dẽf + em dsm + ef dsf − 2 dr +
dφ,
N
r N
r
g 00 (ẽm )
g 0 (ẽm )Ṽ33
dDsg − dDug
1
· dẽm =
+ θ3 dr − dφ,
³ ´2 dY − dsm −
r
r
Ṽ3
Ṽ3
g 00 (ẽf )
g 0 (ẽf )Ṽ33
g 0 (ẽf )Ṽ32 P
· dẽf =
dY
−
³ ´2
³ ´2 dr − dsf ,
Ṽ3
Ṽ3
Ṽ3 r

(11)
(12)

(13)

where
Y2 = φu + N em φ + N e∗f φ + N (1 − em )φu + N (1 − e∗f )φu + D,
φ − φu
θ1 = φu −
− sm ,
r
φ − φu
θ2 = φu −
− sf ,
r
Dsg − Dug + φ − φu g 0 (ẽm )Ṽ32 P
θ3 =
− ³ ´2 .
r2
Ṽ3 r
Note that in view of (9) and (10), θ1 > 0, θ2 > 0. Furthermore, a sufficient condition
for θ3 > 0 is that V32 < 0, an assumption that we shall make henceforth.12
12

If the utility function w(c1 , c2 ) (see (1)) is homogeneous of degree 1 in c1 and c2 , V32 is indeed negative.
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From (11) we see that an increase in either em or ef reduces total income (discounted
over two periods), increases in the subsidy rates and skilled wage rate raise income, and an
increase in the discount (interest) rate reduces income. The latter two effects are straightforward to explain. The first effects are due to the fact in our education equilibria (equations
(6), (7), (9) and (10)), we have negative discounted pecuniary returns to education (see
footnote 10).
An increase in total income Y raises both ẽm and ẽf as can be seen from the first
terms on the right and sides of (12) and (13). These are due to pure income effects: an
increase in Y reduces the marginal utility of income V3 and therefore increases the dollar
value of non-pecuniary returns to education (first terms on the left hand sides of (9) and
(10)). The effect of the subsidy rate sm (sf ) has the direct effect of increasing the marginal
benefit of educating a boy (girl) and thus its effect on ẽm (ẽf ) is positive. Similarly, an
increase in Dsg (or a decrease in Dug ) raises the marginal benefit of education a boy and thus
ẽm . This however has no direct effect on ẽf for reasons mentioned after (10). An increase
in r increases V3 since V32 < 0 and thus unambiguously reduces the equilibrium value of
ẽf . There is an additional negative effect of an increase in r on ẽm via the reduction in the
present value of marginal benefits (Dsg − Dug + φ − φu )/r. Finally, an increase in skilled wage
rate φ has no direct effect on ef as the families do not internalize the contributions of skilled
daughters-in-law, but raises em .
Substituting (11) into (12) and (13) we obtain
1
1
α1 dẽm + α2 dẽf = β1 dsm + β2 dsf + β3 dr + dDug − dDsg
r
r
·
¸
α2 (ẽm + ẽf ) 1
+
−
dφ,
θ2 r
r
α3 (ẽm + ẽf )
α3 dẽm + α4 dẽf = β4 dsm + β5 dsf + β6 dr +
dφ,
θ1 r
where
α1 =

g 0 (ẽm )N Ṽ33
g 00 (ẽm )
+ θ1 ³ ´2
< 0,
Ṽ3
Ṽ

α2 = θ2

3

α3 = θ1

β1 =

g 0 (ẽf )Ṽ33 N
³ ´2 < 0,
Ṽ3

α4 =

g 0 (ẽf )Ṽ33 N
g 00 (ẽf )
+ θ2 ³ ´2 < 0,
Ṽ3
Ṽ
3

g 0 (ẽm )Ṽ33 N ẽm
− 1 < 0,
³ ´2
Ṽ3

β2 = −

g 0 (ẽm )Ṽ33 Y2
³ ´2 > 0,
Ṽ3 r

β4 = −

β3 = θ 3 −

g 0 (ẽf )Ṽ33 N ẽf
β5 =
− 1 < 0,
³ ´2
Ṽ3

g 0 (ẽm )Ṽ33 N
<0
³ ´2
Ṽ3

g 0 (ẽm )Ṽ33 N ẽf
> 0,
³ ´2
Ṽ3

g 0 (ẽf )Ṽ33 N ẽm
> 0,
³ ´2
Ṽ3
´
g 0 (ẽf ) ³
β6 = − ³ ´2 · Ṽ32 P + Ṽ33 Y2 > 0.
Ṽ3 r
8

(14)
(15)

Solving (14) and (15) simultaneously, we obtain
β1 α4 − α2 β4
dẽm
=
> 0,
dsm
∆
dẽm
β2 α4 − α2 β5
=
< 0,
dsf
∆

α1 β4 − α3 β1
dẽf
=
< 0,
dsm
∆
dẽf
α1 β5 − α3 β2
=
> 0,
dsf
∆

dẽf
α1 β6 − α3 β3
g 00 (ẽm )β6 (Dsg − Dug + φ − φu )θ1 g 0 (ẽf )Ṽ33 N
=
=
−
,
³ ´2
dr
∆
Ṽ3 ∆
r Ṽ
3

(Dsg

Dug

u

0

dẽm
β3 α4 − α2 β6
−
+ φ − φ )α4 g (ẽm )g 00 (ẽf )β6
=
=
+
dr
∆
r
g 0 (ẽf )Ṽ3
dẽm
α4
dẽf
−α3
< 0,
> 0,
g =
g =
dDu
r∆
dDu
r∆
dẽm
−α4
dẽf
α3
> 0,
< 0,
g =
g =
dDs
r∆
dDs
r∆
dẽm
−α4 θ2 + α2 g 00 (ẽf )(ẽm + ẽf )
dẽf
α3 θ1 + α3 g 00 (ẽm )(ẽm + ẽf )
=
> 0,
=
,
dφ
rθ2 ∆
dφ
rθ1 ∆

< 0,
(16)
(17)
(18)

where ∆ = α1 α4 − α2 α3 > 0 from the second order condition.
As one would expect we find that a subsidy to children of a particular gender increases
their school enrollment rate, but reduces that of children of the opposite gender. This cross
effect occurs via changes in the marginal utility of income V3 . An increase in sm , for example,
reduces income Y and thus increases V3 which in turn reduces the marginal non-pecuniary
benefit of sending a girl to school. For the same cross-effect we find that whereas an increase
in r unambiguously reduces ẽm , its effect on ẽf is ambiguous.
An increase in r, for a given value of ẽm increases V3 and therefore reduces ẽf . But the
cross-effect via changes in ẽm increases ẽf . The asymmetry in the effects on ẽm and ẽf is due
to the fact that skill premium in labor as well as in marriage market (which directly depend
on the interest factor) affect the marginal condition for ẽm , but not that for ẽf . However,
the effect of a change in r on the total enrollment rate is unambiguous when sm = sf . In
particular, with sm = sf ,
d(ẽm + ẽf )
g 00 (ẽm )β6 g 0 (ẽm )g 00 (ẽf )β6 (Dsg − Dug + φ − φu )g 00 (ẽf )
+
+
< 0.
=
dr
Ṽ3
g 0 (ẽf )Ṽ3
rṼ3
An increase in φ unambiguously increases ẽm , but has two opposing effects on ẽf .
A higher skilled wage raises the marginal pecuniary benefit of educating a boy.13 This
is the direct positive effect. An increase in φ also increases family income which reduces
the marginal utility of income and thus raises the ‘dollar’ value of marginal non-pecuniary
13

One can also carry out a comparative static exercise with respect to unskilled wage rate φu . The direct
effect of an increase in φu will reduce both em and ef by increasing the opportunity cost of education. But
an increase in φu will increase income and this will increase both em and ef . So the net effect on both is
ambiguous and will depend on the relative magnitude of income effect vis-a-vis the price (opportunity cost)
effect. This exercise is left out for the sake of brevity.
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benefit of educating a boy (the first term in (9)). Thus the effect of an increase in φ on ẽm
is unambiguously positive. As for the effect on ẽf , the direct effect is absent. The second
positive effect via changes in income is present; but there is an additional negative effect
which appears because of the perfect substitutability of boys’ and girls’ income, i.e., the
direct benefit of educating a boy mentioned above reduces the need to educate a girl. Thus
the net effect of φ on ẽf is ambiguous. However, we are able to say a little bit more the effect
of φ on the ratio ẽm /ẽf . When sm = sf , θ1 = θ2 > 0 and so from (18) we get
³ ´
½
¾
d ẽẽmf
ẽm 1 dẽm
1 dẽf
·
·
=
−
dφ
ẽf ẽm dφ
ẽf dφ
³
´
h 00
i
g (ẽf )ẽf
Ṽ33 N (ẽm +ẽf )g 0 (ẽm )g 0 (ẽf )
g 00 (ẽm )ẽm
α4
α3
−θ
+
+
·
−
1 ẽm
ẽf
g 0 (ẽf )
g 0 (ẽm )
ẽm
ẽm ẽf (Ṽ3 )3
=
·
. (19)
ẽf
rθ1 ∆
From the above equation we can conclude that if the sub-utility function g(·) is of
the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) type, i.e., if g 00 (e)e/g 0 (e) is constant for all e,
then the term within the square bracket on the right hand side of (19) is zero and therefore
d(ẽm /ẽf )/dφ > 0. In other words, when the sub-utility function g is of the CRRA type, an
increase in skilled wage rate makes bias against girls worse.
As for the effects of dowry, from (16) and (17), we find that an increase in the skill
premium for the groom in the marriage market, Dsg − Dug , raises ẽm , but reduces ẽf . The
latter effect is due to the indirect effect via changes in ẽm explained above. This confirms
the assertion made in the paragraph just before subsection 2.2.1. Thus we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 The presence of groom-price dowry increases school enrollment of boys and
reduces that of girls, as compared to the case where there is no dowry.
Having analyzed the case of groom-price dowry, we now move to the case of bride-price
dowry in the following subsection.

2.3

Bride-price of dowry

In this subsection we assume that there is a bride price for dowry, i.e., the dowry is bride
specific and the amount depends on whether she is educated or not. Denoting by Dsb and
Dub respectively the amount of dowry that an educated and an uneducated bride pays, the
net amount of dowry received by the family is
¤
¤ £
£
(20)
D = N e∗f Dsb + N (1 − e∗f )Dub − N ef Dsb + N (1 − ef )Dub .
The term inside the first square bracket on the right hand side of (8) is the amount of dowry
received by the bridegrooms and the that inside the second square bracket is the amount of
10

dowry paid out for the brides. Since skill level of the daughters-in-law are decided outside
the family, the family cannot affect the amount of dowry received by its choice of education
variables.
The first order condition for em and ef in this case are
g 0 (êm )

φ − φu
= φu ,
+ sm +
r
V̂3
0
b
g (êf )
D − Dsb
+ sf + u
= φu ,
r
V̂3

(21)
(22)

where êm and êf are respectively the equilibrium values of em and ef in this equilibrium and
V̂3 is the value of the marginal utility of income evaluated at the present equilibrium.
Note that, as opposed to the case of groom-price dowry, the skill premium in the
marriage market now applies to the marginal condition for ef and not that for em . It can be
easily verified, following the proof given in footnote 11, that when sm = sf , êm > êf if and
only if φ − φu > Dub − Dsb , i.e., if and only if the skill premium for boys in the labor market
is larger than the skill premium for brides in the marriage market. Formally,
Proposition 3 In the presence of bride-price of dowry, bias against girls in school enrollment exists if and only if the skill premium for boys in the labor market is larger than the
skill premium for brides in the marriage market.
As in the previous subsection, we now want to examine if bride-price of dowry increases
bias against girls as compared to the case where there is no dowry. For this, we first of all
resort to a number of comparative static exercises in the following subsection.
2.3.1

Comparative statics

Parallel to (14) and (15) in this case,14 we find
α1 dêm + α2 dêf = β1 dsm + β2 dsf + β7 dr,
ˆf
α3 dêm + α4 de

1
1
= β4 dsm + β5 dsf + β8 dr − dDub + dDsb ,
r
r

(23)
(24)

where αi (i = 1, · · · , 4), β1 , β2 , β4 , β5 are defined after (15) and
´ φ − φu
g 0 (êm ) ³
> 0,
β7 = − ³ ´2 · V̂32 P + V̂33 Y2 +
r2
V̂3 r
´ Db − Db
g 0 (êf ) ³
β8 = − ³ ´2 · V̂32 P + V̂33 Y2 + u 2 s > 0.
r
V̂3 r
14

We do not consider the effect of changes in φ in this case as they are exactly the same as in the case of
groom-price dowry.
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Solving (23) and (24) simultaneously we obtain
dêm
β7 α4 − β8 α2
β7 g 00 (êf ) θ2 g 0 (êf )V̂33 N (φu − sm )
=
=
+
³ ´2
dr
∆
V̂3 ∆
V̂
r∆
3

−

θ2 g 0 (êm )V̂33 N (φu − sf )
,
³ ´2
V̂3 r∆

(25)

α1 β8 − α3 β7
β8 g 00 (êm ) θ1 g 0 (êm )V̂33 N (φu − sf )
dêf
=
=
+
³ ´2
dr
∆
V̂3 ∆
r∆
V̂
3

−
dêm
α2
=
< 0,
dDub
r∆
dêm
−α2
=
> 0,
b
dDs
r∆

θ1 g 0 (êf )V̂33 N (φu − sm )
,
³ ´2
V̂3 r∆

dêf
−α1
=
> 0,
dDub
r∆
dêf
α1
=
< 0.
b
dDs
r∆

(26)

(27)
(28)

From (25) and (26), we observe that the effect of a change in r on both êm and êf
are ambiguous because in the present case a change in the discount rate has direct effect on
the marginal conditions for both variables. However, when sm = sf , we get the following
results.
From (25) we find that when sm = sf = s
dêm
β7 g 00 (êf ) θ2 V̂33 N (φu − s)(g 0 (êf ) − g 0 (êm )
+
=
.
dr
V̂3 ∆
∆r(V̂3 )2

(29)

Since g 00 < 0 and V33 < 0, it follows from the above equation that if êm > êf , we must have
dêm /dr < 0.
Similarly, from (26) we find that when sm = sf = s
dêf
β8 g 00 (êm ) θ1 V̂33 N (φu − s)(g 0 (êm ) − g 0 (êf )
=
+
.
dr
V̂3 ∆
∆r(V̂3 )2

(30)

Once again, since g 00 < 0 and V33 < 0, it follows from the above equation that if êf > êm ,
we must have dêf /dr < 0. That is, an increase in r decreases school enrollment rate of the
‘favored’ gender.
As for the effect of r on total enrollment, summing over (29) and (30), we get
β8 g 00 (êm ) β7 g 00 (êf )
d(êm + êf )
=
+
< 0.
dr
V̂3 ∆
V̂3 ∆
Finally, turning to the effects of dowry, from (27) and (28), it is clear that an increase
in skill premium for brides in the marriage market, Dub − Dsb , unambiguously increases êf
12

and unambiguously decreases êm . The intuitions are similar to the ones given in subsection
2.2.1. This result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The presence of bride-price dowry increases school enrollment of girls and
reduces that of boys, as compared to the case where there is no dowry.
It should be noted that in the case of either groom-price dowry or bride-price dowry,
it is the skill premium in the marriage market — i.e., Dsg − Dug (for the case of groom-price
dowry) or Dub − Dsb (for the case of bride-price dowry) — that affects school enrollment rates.
If skill-premium in the marriage market is absent, the level of dowry rates will not affect the
marginal conditions (see (9) and (22)) and will have no income effect as in equilibrium net
dowry payment is zero, i.e., dowry payments for daughters cancel out with dowry receipts
for sons (see (8) and (20)).
This completes our analysis of the the different equilibria that we presented and the
comparative static exercises. In the next section we shall focus of the policy variables sm
and sf .

3

A policy experiment

A measure to increase school enrollment that is actually being applied is a program — being
tested in countries like Brazil, Mexico and Bangladesh by the World Bank — which pays
families to send their children to school. This program, also known as Bolsa Escola in Brazil
and PROGRESA in Mexico, gives poor families a means-tested income subsidy, typically
in the form of food rations, for sending their children to school on a full time basis. In
this section we want to examine if an introduction of a certain amount of discrimination in
the application of this program can reduce bias in school enrollment without lowering total
enrollment.15 In particular, we consider a reform of the program which changes the levels of
subsidies according to the following formula
dsm =

λ
,
em

dsf =

λ
,
ef

(31)

where λ is a positive constant.16 That is, the children of a particular gender that has a lower
school enrollment rate receives a higher subsidy than the other children.
Taking the expressions for βi , (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) as defined after (15) and using (31), we
get
λ
,
em
λ
= − .
ef

β1 dsm + β2 dsf = −

(32)

β4 dsm + β5 dsf

(33)

15

Note that since we do not change any of the dowry parameters or the interest rate, the following analysis
can be applied to any of the three equilibria that we have described in this paper.
16
If the total funds available for the program is limited, λ can be adjusted to meet the budget constraint.

13

Setting the sm = sf and substituting (32) and (33) into (14) and (15) we obtain
em ef ∆
g 00 (ef )ef
θ2 V33 N [g 0 (em )em − g 0 (ef )ef ]
dem = −
+
,
λ
V3
(V3 )2
em ef ∆
g 00 (em )em θ1 V33 N [g 0 (ef )ef − g 0 (em )em ]
def = −
+
,
λ
V3
(V3 )2
em ef ∆
g 00 (ef )ef
g 00 (em )em
d(em + ef ) = −
−
> 0.
λ
V3
V3

(34)
(35)
(36)

If g 0 (e) + eg 00 (e) > 0 for all 0 ≤ e ≤ 1, i.e., if eg 0 (e) is an increasing function of e, it
follows from (34) and (35) that def > 0 if em > ef and dem > 0 if ef > em . In other words,
the policy experiment that we consider in this section will result in a higher enrollment of
girls in the cases of no dowry and groom-price dowry and also in the case of bride-price
dowry if skill premium in the labor market in higher than the skill premium for brides in the
marriage market.17 When skill premium in the labor market is lower than the skill premium
for brides in the marriage market (for the case of bride-price dowry), more girls than boys
go to school and our suggested reform will increase enrollment of boys. Interestingly, it also
follows from (36) that in all the cases our reform will result in an increase in total enrollment.

4

An Empirical Test

The purpose of this section is to test empirically some of the predictions of our theoretical
analysis using cross-country data. It may be recalled that in our analysis we focused on
the inability of the families to coordinate their actions and thus to internalize inter-family
externalities, and a particular type of social institution, viz., an extended family system
where married women becomes part of the extended family of the in-laws, as two important
reasons for the existence of gender bias in school enrollments. We also found that a particular
type of dowry, viz., groom-price dowry, makes the scales tilt even further against women.
In order to test this basic premise, we conduct a very simple empirical exercise using
cross-country data from the World Bank and the UNDP. We keep the exercise simple for
practical reasons. First, some of our key variables are difficult to quantify. For example,
ability or inability to coordinate actions is a point in hand. It is also difficult to compile data
on social institutions including the extent of dowry. Second, the amount of missing observations also renders some of the variables such as school enrollment rates and manufacturing
wage rates unusable. Given these limitations, we are forced make use of proxies for many of
the variables.
As for the dependent variable, we use the ratio of male to female literacy rates for
youth between ages 15 and 24 (called LITERACY below) as a proxy for bias against girls
in school enrollment. Direct data on primary school enrollment is available, but it is not
used for a number of reasons. First, as mentioned above, there are large number of missing
17

Note that in these three cases, fewer girls than boys go to school.
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observations in this series. Second, the standard deviation of primary enrollment is rather
low in the sample: the median primary enrollment rate is 98%. Finally, since marriage is
at the heart of our analysis, the age group 15-24 seems more appropriate to consider. In
any case, one would expect that a higher school enrollment should translate into a higher
literacy rate. As for the ease (or the difficulty) in coordination, we use two proxies: total
land area and total number of poor people in the country. Given a population, the larger the
geographic size of the country the more difficult for the families to coordinate their actions as
families are more spread out. Similarly, given the size of a country, the lower the population
size the more difficult it is to coordinate actions as once again people would be more spread
out. Since gender bias is more significant among the poor, we consider only that part of
the population living in poverty, i.e., total number of poor people in the country, as another
proxy for ease in coordination.18 These two variables are transformed into their natural
logs and are called LAND and POOR respectively. Finding a proxy for skill-premium in the
marriage market (i.e., in dowry) is more difficult. Since it is widely thought that dowry exists
in its most oppressive form in South and South-East Asia (see, for example, Epstein, 1973
and Rao, 1993), we use a South and South-East Asia dummy as a proxy for this variable
and call it SASIA.
As it is explained in the introduction, although we focus on the above variables for
our theoretical analysis, there are other important determinants of gender bias. Two such
factors are the overall level of (socioeconomic) development in a country and relative labor
market participation rates for the two genders (see, for example, Kynch and Sen, 1983). We
include the Human Development Index (HDI) as produced by the UNDP to represent the
overall state of development of a country and female to male labor force participation ratio
(LABOR) as an additional control variable.
We utilize a simple OLS framework for our regressions using the World Bank’s World
development Indicators, 2001 for all variables except HDI which is from the 2000 Human
Development Report of the UNDP. We do not include the high income countries and have a
total of 97 countries in our sample, although because of missing observations the actual sample size is somewhat lower. All results are corrected for White heteroscedasticity-consistent
Standard errors and covariance. We present below two OLS estimated equations; the second
one having an additional explanatory variable in LABOR.
18

In some cases, a higher population may make it more difficult to coordinate actions. Thus, the effect
of this variable can go either way. However, we believe that it is the density aspect of population which is
more important than the size aspect.
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Literacy

=

0.83
+ 0.06 Land
(5.97)
(2.24)

R2 = 0.37

Literacy

-

Sample=57

=

0.74
+ 0.06 Land (4.72)
(2.19)
- 0.13 Labor
(-1.22)

R2 = 0.38

Sample=56

0.08 Poor
(-2.49)

-

0.78 HDI
(-3.76)

+ 0.24 SASIA
(2.67)

-

0.83 HDI
(-3.92)

+ 0.23 SASIA
(2.62)

F-Stat=7.59

0.07 Poor
(-2.34)

F-Stat=6.10

(t-Statistics are in parenthesis)
Given the discussions above, we should expect LAND and SASIA to be positively,
and POOR, HDI and LABOR to be negatively, related to LITERACY, and that is exactly
what we find. Furthermore, all but the coefficient for LABOR are statistically significant at
the confidence level of 5% or less.19
We realize that this is a very simplistic exercise and that our results are tentative at
best given our liberal use of proxies. However, we checked for the robustness of these results
by interchanging the dependent variable with adult male-female literacy ratio and the results
remain essentially unchanged and, replacing HDI by GDP per capita also does not change
the results much except lowering the significance level a little. Therefore, it can be said that
these results are suggestive and provide some support to our theoretical analysis.

5

Conclusion

Discrimination in general, and discrimination against girls and women in particular, come in
different shapes and sizes. Many aspects of the bias against girls have been discussed in the
literature and many different explanations provided. In this paper we focus on discrimination against girls in school enrollment and explain such phenomenon in terms of interactions
between a number specific types of social institutions. In particular, we consider the institution of an extended family system in which married women become part of their in-laws’
families. To be more specific, we develop a two-period model in which a family decides at
the beginning of period 1 how many of the children should go to school. If the children
go to school they become skilled and earn a higher wage in period 2. Whereas educated
boys earn a higher income for the family, educated girls do so for their in-laws’ families.
If the families coordinate their action and take into account the contributions of educated
daughters-in-laws’ contributions to family income, there would be no bias against girls in
school enrollments in our framework. However, the lack of such coordinations results in
discrimination against girls in our benchmark model.
19
In some societies, young girls are educated so that good husbands can be found for them and not for labor
market reasons (see footnote 5). This is possibly a reason why the coefficient for LABOR is not significant.
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Having established the above-mentioned mechanism which puts young girls at a disadvantage, we then introduce another social institution, viz., dowry, and examine if it aggravates the situation. We find that under groom-price dowry, i.e., when the amount of dowry
depends on the education level of the groom, it indeed increases the level of discrimination.
Under bride-price dowry, there is still discrimination if and only if skill premium in the labor
market is larger than that in the marriage market.
Having characterized the equilibrium under different forms of dowry, we consider a
policy experiment in which subsidies are provided to a family if it sends its children to school
and the level of subsidy depends on the gender of the child that goes to school. We suggest
a particular scheme for such a policy that will reduce the bias and increase total enrollment
at the same time.
Finally, using cross-country data, we empirically test some of the predictions of our
theoretical analysis. Although such tests should be treated with caution, it provides some
evidence to suggest that inabilities of the families to internalize inter-family externalities and
dowry are to some extent responsible for the bias against girls in school enrollments.
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